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Abstract
This paper provides a dynamic general equilibrium framework to
investigate how organizations change the modes to govern transactions
over time. We show that the agency problem becomes less serious when
the economy is developed well so that large market size favors decen-
tralized organizations having more specialization. We then show that
di®erent organizational modes endogenously emerge even in the same
economy and cause endogenous process of economic development.
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1 Introduction
In his classical book of economics Wealth of Nations Adam Smith discussed
that specialization or division of labor is one of the most important engines to
enhance the productivity of labor but the extent of specialization is limited
by market size (See Smith (1776, Chapter 1 and 3)). In this paper we will
elaborate these Adam Smith's views further in the following three directions
and investigate how dynamical changes of organizational modes to manage
the division of labor cause the endogenous process of economic development.
First, the e®ects of market size on specialization are not in one way.
Rather the market size a®ects not only the degree of specialization but
also is a®ected by how specialization proceeds in the economy. This is
because specialization enhances the labor productivity and hence raises labor
demand. This in turn results in higher wage income to make consumption
level higher and thus make market size actually larger. Thus the degree of
specialization and market size interact with each other through such general
equilibrium e®ect.
Second, specialization (division of labor) is not only technological but
also organizational issue such as how total production process is divided
into specialized tasks, how these tasks are delegated to di®erent agents and
how they are motivated to work hard for their specialized tasks. More de-
centralized organizations involve more specialization so that di®erent tasks
are delegated to di®erent and specialized agents. Such specialization con-
tributes to expanding the technological productivity of organizations. How-
ever, agents who are specialized on some tasks may obtain the powers and
discretion to control their tasks in their own interests and hence may not
work in the interests of the principal of an organization. In particular their
e®orts exerted for tasks may not be observable to the principal. This sort
of asymmetric information between the principal (capitalist) and delegated
agents limits specialization and decentralization because the principal faces
the trade{o® between incentives and rent extraction: Some rent must be
left to delegated agent over his reservation payo® which could be otherwise
obtained by his outside opportunity in the economy.
Third, the general equilibrium interactions between the market size and
specialization are not static but rather dynamic through the change of orga-
nizational modes. When the market size changes over time, this may change
the trade{o® between specialization and agency problem which then causes
the change of optimal organizational modes to balance such trade{o®. This
change of organizational modes has the dynamic feedback e®ects on the
market size and hence the process of economic development.
We will integrate these issues in a uni¯ed framework and show that
optimal organizational mode (degree of decentralization) depends on the
development stages of the economy: When the economy is developed well
so that the market wage is high enough, agents who work for the principal
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of an organization face better outside opportunity which could be otherwise
obtained if they rejected the contracts o®ered by the current principals and
worked elsewhere in the economy. Then, although the agents have infor-
mational advantage over the principal, they may obtain smaller rent when
the economy is developed well. This makes the trade{o® between incentives
and rent extraction less serious so that it becomes more attractive for the
principals to choose more decentralized organizations in which more tasks
are specialized and delegated to agents.
However, the story does not end here because the general equilibrium
feedback comes in: When the principals choose more decentralized orga-
nizations, higher degree of specialization will contribute to expanding the
production level and hence labor demand in the economy wide, which then
pushes up wage income and actually makes the outside opportunity of agents
better.
This general equilibrium e®ect through the choice of organizational modes
causes the diversion of the processes of economic development. If the princi-
pals choose decentralized organizations, they expect that specialization will
proceed and hence result in higher economic development, which then ac-
tually makes decentralized organization attractive for them. On the other
hand, if the principals choose centralized organizations, they expect that
specialization will be limited and hence the economy will be less developed,
which then actually makes centralized organization attractive for them.
Hence multiple equilibrium paths arise even in the same economy: Some of
them take the advantage of specialization and involve decentralized organi-
zations but others lose the gains from specialization and involve centralized
organizations. These di®erent development paths emerge even when the
economy starts from the same initial condition. 1
These results might explain why there are signi¯cant di®erences in orga-
nizational modes to govern transactions across countries. Casual empiricism
suggests the diversity of organizational structures across countries. For ex-
ample it has been argued that the Japanese automobile industry is less
vertically integrated than the U.S. counterpart.2 It was also reported that
1Some papers focus on the related issues such as how contract (or organizational)
designs a®ect and are a®ected by economic development. Esfahani and Mookherjee (1995)
consider the Shapiro{Stiglitz type shirking model and show that both high powered and
low powered contracts may emerge even in the same economy. Legros, Newman and
Proto (2006) consider the endogenous growth model with organizational design in which
a division of labor plays two di®erent roles; enhancing innovation and monitoring workers
by managers. Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002, 2006) investigate the endogenous
growth model in which investment technology choice is endogenous and related to contract
design and organizational choice such as vertical integration. See also Aghion, Gri±th and
Howitt (2006).
2See Aoki (1988) for a comparative study on the Japanese ¯rms. See also Abraham and
Taylor (1996) and Helper (1991) for the evidence about supplier systems and outsourcing
decisions in U.S. industries.
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in 1980s the Japanese electronics subcontractors had focused on fewer cus-
tomers than the U.K. ¯rms.3 Furthermore the U.S. electronics companies
like Apple and Dell recently have limited their main businesses to marketing
and sales by outsourcing their production decisions to independent contract
manufacturers while Asian electronics companies like Sony, Toshiba and
Samsung have maintained the strategy of in{house productions (See Berger
(2005)).
Second, diversity of organizational modes is not only the phenomenon
observed across countries but also even in the same country and industry. 4
To account for this stylized fact, we show that there exist the mixed steady
states in which di®erent organizational modes, centralized and decentralized
organizations, co{exist even in the same economy. We then show that there
exists equilibrium paths converging to such mixed steady states, and hence
co{existence of di®erent organizations persists even in the long run. This
result will be also useful for understanding why di®erent patterns to organize
productions co{exist even in the same country and same industry.
Third, we show whether or not decentralized organization becomes dom-
inant in the long run depends on the exogenous costs of starting up projects.
Such costs may be higher not only when the investment technology of en-
trepreneurs is ine±cient but also when severe regulations are imposed by
government, when contracting costs are large and when credit markets are
imperfect. We then show that a long run equilibrium is uniquely character-
ized by decentralized organization when such staring up cost is su±ciently
small. However, when the staring up cost is large, the economy is more likely
to be stuck in centralized organization equilibrium. Thus our result suggests
that the severity and di±culty of staring up projects make organizational
modes biased toward more centralization. This view is consistent with the
recent empirical study by Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2005, 2007) which
focus on the determinants of vertical integration across countries by using a
large data set. They found that countries with higher contracting costs and
tighter regulation are more likely to be concentrated in vertically integrated
industries. 5
Furthermore our results shed lights on the dynamic relationship between
business practices and economic development. In fact we show that the
steady state with centralized organization corresponds to smaller economic
development level than the steady state with decentralized organization.
3See Nishiguchi (Chapter 5 and 6, 1994) for this evidence.
4For example Berger (2005) reported that di®erent companies in the U.S. microchip
industry have adopted di®erent strategies of organizing their productions.
5Acemoglu, Johnson and Mittion (2005) also reported the result that countries with less
developed ¯nancial markets are more likely to be vertically integrated in the technology
intensive or human capital intensive industries. Acemoglu, Johnson and Mittion (2007)
emphasized the interactive e®ects of ¯nancial development and contracting costs on the
propensity of vertical integration.
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This suggests the testable implication that ¯rms are more likely to rely on
the business practices in the centralized and integrated manners when the
economy is less developed. Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2000) provide the
related evidence that group a±liated ¯rms, which are based on common
ownership and control, outperform focused, una±liated ¯rms in emerging
markets such as India. Moreover, as shown by Chandler (1962)'s famous
analysis about U.S. business history, in the late 19th century U.S. ¯rms be-
came bigger through vertical integration and re{organized their corporate
structures in the centralized way known as U{form (unitary form). However,
these U.S. big ¯rms shifted their corporate structures from U{from to more
decentralized form known as M{form (multidivisional form) in the early 20th
century as their focused businesses were expanded. 6 This U.S. business his-
tory might be consistent with our result that organizational modes become
more decentralized as the market size becomes bigger.
The remaining sections are organized as follows: In Section 2 we will set
up the basic model of the overlapping generations economy. In Section 3
we will characterize the equilibrium organizations and in Section 4 we will
derive the dynamical system to govern the change of organizational modes.
In Section 5 we will discuss the implications about contracting choices of
intermediate inputs such as outsourcing and vertical integration. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Model
2.1 Overlapping Generations Economy
We consider the overlapping generations economy in which a continuum of
new generation is born with a constant population size in each period. Time
is discrete and extends over in¯nity (t = 0; 1; 2; :::). There is a single ¯nal
good which is used both for consumption and investment. A newly born
individual lives for two periods, say \young" and \old." In each generation
there are two types of individuals, called principals and agents, with one
unit measure and µ unit measure respectively. Each agent is endowed with
one unit labor in each period of his life while each principal is endowed with
no labor inputs. In the model there are three perfectly competitive markets,
i.e., credit market, labor market and good market. Each individual is risk
neutral and maximizes his or her utility when old (he or she can obtain
utility only from old consumption).
There are two types of workers, unskilled and skilled workers. All young
agents start as unskilled workers because they do not have any speci¯c skills
when young. Thus in period t each young agent inelastically supplies one
6In the early 20th century the U.S. market became geographically bigger via expanding
railway networks. Such expansion of the market size pushed the U.S. big ¯rms toward the
change of organizational forms.
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unit labor and earns the competitive market wage wt. Since each agent
obtains no utilities from consumption when young, he simply saves all his
income wt. Let ½t+1 denote the (gross) interest rate paid in credit market in
period t+1. Then each young agent who was born in period t will earn the
interest income ½t+1wt when old (period t+ 1). There are two occupations
for each old agent in period t+ 1: One is to supply one unit labor and earn
the competitive market wage wt+1 as an unskilled worker again. The other
option is to work as a skilled worker for managing a project, which we will
explain more in details below. To be a skilled worker, each old agent needs
to spend his labor endowment in adulthood for learning and acquiring the
skills which are necessary and speci¯c for the implementation of the project.
Thus old agents consist of unskilled workers and skilled workers.
Each young principal can create projects by investing ¸ > 0 goods per
project in one period advance. Here ¸ captures the parameter value af-
fecting the costs of starting up a project. These costs become higher not
only when the principal's investment technology is ine±cient but also when
institutions underlying the economy are not well developed so that more
administrative costs are needed to start up a project. The latter may be
due to severe regulations imposed by government and higher contracting
costs in the economy (We will give further justi¯cation for ¸ later). Since
each young principal has no incomes, she needs to access to credit market
in order to ¯nance these projects. If a young principal raises a project in
period t, she will obtain stochastic returns from that project in the next
period (t + 1). To implement a project in period t + 1, each old principal
needs to hire one skilled worker for managing the project as well as employ
competitive unskilled workers for production at the market wage wt+1.
In period t + 1 each project which was ¯nanced in period t will yield
stochastic returns. If the outcome is failure, then the project yields nothing.
If the outcome is success, then the project yields the output Y by employing
unskilled workers L from the competitive labor market according to the
production function Y = F (L). We will make the standard assumption
that F is continuously di®erentiable, monotone increasing, F 0 > 0, and
strictly concave, F 00 < 0, with F (0) = 0 and Inada conditions F 0(0) = 1
and F 0(1) = 0.
Since the labor market is perfectly competitive, the maximum pro¯t of
each successful project becomes
¼(w) ´ max
L¸0
F (L)¡ wL: (1)
Here ¼ is decreasing and convex, ¼0 < 0 and ¼00 > 0. Let also g(w) denote
the corresponding labor demand, i.e., F 0(g(w)) ´ w.
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2.2 Matching
At the beginning of each period the projects created in the previous period
and old agents (potential skilled workers) are randomly matched with each
other. Let Kt+1 denote the number of total projects created by young prin-
cipals in period t and hence used for production in period t+1. Then Kt+1
projects and µ old agents are randomly matched with each other according
to the matching function m(Kt+1; µ). Here we assume that m is increasing
in its ¯rst argument and satis¯es the following condition: m(K; µ) · °µ
for all K ¸ 0 for some ° 2 (0; 1). Also we assume that m(0; µ) = 0.
Then each project will succeed in matching an old agent with probability
®(Kt+1) ´ m(Kt+1; µ)=Kt+1 while each old agent will succeed in matching
a project with probability ¯(Kt+1) ´ m(Kt+1; µ)=µ.
The old agent who succeeded in matching a project can be a potential
skilled worker who will handle the project he matched. Alternatively he can
always reject to work as a skilled worker even when he matched a project.
In that case such old agent will work as an unskilled worker to earn the
market wage in the competitive labor market. On the other hand, any old
agent who failed to match a project has nothing but to work as an unskilled
worker.
2.3 Specialization (Division of Labor)
Each project has two tasks, called task 1 and task 2, and costly e®ort is
needed for each task to be completed. We assume that by some technological
reasons task 1 of each project can be handled only by old principal. However,
task 2 of a project can be delegated to a matched old agent, called skilled
worker. Each project's outcomes, success and failure, depend on the e®orts
exerted for two tasks of the project. E®ort choice is assumed to be binary,
high e®ort (h) or low e®ort (l), for any task. We will denote by a 2 fh; lg the
principal's e®ort exerted for task 1 of a project. Let also denote by ep 2 fh; lg
(resp. em 2 fh; lg) the principal's (resp. the skilled worker's) e®ort for task 2
of a project when the principal (resp. the skilled worker) handles that task.
Then we assume that each matched project will succeed with probability
P (a; ei) 2 (0; 1) but fail with probability 1 ¡ P (a; ei) respectively. We will
here assume that phh ´ P (h; h) > phl = plh ´ P (h; l) = P (l; h) > pll ´
P (l; l) > 0. Let also ¢p ´ phh¡phl and ¢q ´ phl¡pll. We will then assume
the diminishing returns: ¢q > ¢p.
When an old principal handles two tasks of a project together at a time,
she will personally incur her e®ort cost as cp(a; ep) where cp(h; h) = ~c >
cp(h; l) = cp(l; h) = c > cp(l; l) = 0. On the other hand, when tasks 2
of a project is carried out by a matched old agent (skilled worker) (but
task 1 must be handled by the principal herself), the skilled worker will
personally incur his e®ort cost as cm(em) for task 2 of the project where
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cm(h) = c > cm(l) = 0 while the principal will incur her e®ort cost as cp(ep)
for task 1 of the project where cp(h) = c > cp(l) = 0. 7 Here to simplify
notation we are assuming that skilled worker's e®ort cost c > 0 is same as
the principal's one. 8 We also assume that each skilled worker has necessary
skills to implement one project and hence he is needed for implementation
of one project even when he is not delegated task 2 of the project.
2.4 Organizational Modes
After the created projects matched old agents, each old principal decides
what organizational modes she should choose for implementing matched
projects and what contracts should be o®ered to the matched old agents who
will work as skilled workers for managing the projects. In other words each
old principal needs to decide whether or not task 2 of a matched project
should be delegated to a matched old agent who will work as an skilled
worker to choose costly e®ort em 2 fh; lg for that task.
We will call the organizational mode in which task 2 of a project is
delegated to a skilled worker decentralized organization or simply D{mode.
In D{mode old principal and skilled worker choose e®orts a 2 fh; lg for task
1 and em 2 fh; lg for task 2 respectively. On the other hand we call the
organizational mode in which both task 1 and 2 of a project are handled
by the old principal herself centralized organization or simply C{mode. In
C{mode only old principal chooses both e®orts a 2 fh; lg for task 1 and
ep 2 fh; lg for task 2 of the project together.
We assume that the veri¯able signals are only the realized outcomes of
each project, i.e., success and failure. Then a contract o®ered to skilled
worker should specify the payments to him contingent on the outcomes of
the project which he is working on. Let CDt = fRDt ; rDt g denote the incentive
contract used for a project under D{mode in period t where RDt (resp. r
D
t )
denotes the payment made from old principal to skilled worker in period t
when the project succeeds (resp. fails) in period t. Also let CCt = fRCt ; rCt g
denote the contract used for a project under C{mode in period t where RCt
(resp. rCt ) is the payment made from old principal to skilled worker when
the project's outcome is realized as success (resp. failure). Recall that we
are assuming that one skilled worker is needed for implementing one project
even when he is not delegated task 2. Thus even in C{mode the contract
7One interpretation for e®ort cost ci(¢) is as follows: Each task of a project gives player
i = m; p who handled it some private returns in terms of the good after the project is
completed. For example, task 2 of a project yields B ¡ ci(ei) goods to the player who
handled it where B > 0. However, it is not veri¯able whether or not each player obtained
the private returns.
8This assumption is not so essential: Even when we allow the principal's e®ort cost
cp(ep) to di®er from the skilled worker's one cm(em), our results will not be substantially
changed as long as these costs do not di®er too much.
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CCt must induce the skilled worker to accept for working on the project.
The timing of events is summarized as follows:
In period t:
1. Each young agent earns and saves the market wage wt.
2. Each young principal creates projects by investing ¸ goods per project.
In period t+ 1:
1. The projects created in period t, denoted by Kt+1, and µ old agents
randomly match with each other according to the matching function
m(Kt+1; µ).
2. Each old principal chooses an organizational mode (D{mode or C{
mode) and o®ers a contract (CCt+1 or C
D
t+1) to a matched old agent for
each matched project.
3. Each old agent who matched a project decides whether or not to accept
the o®ered contract. If he rejects it, he will work as an unskilled worker
(thus he will supply one unit labor to labor market). If he accepts it, he
will spend one unit labor for acquiring necessary skills for the project
and will work as a skilled worker.
4. In D{mode the skilled workers who accepted the contracts and old
principals will simultaneously choose their e®orts em 2 fh; lg for task
2 and a 2 fh; lg for task 1 for matched projects. In C{mode old
principals will choose her e®orts a 2 fh; lg and ep 2 fh; lg for both
tasks of a matched project.
5. The projects' returns are realized and payments are made according
to binding contracts.
In initial period (t = 0) there are a unit mass of old principals who
totally hold K0 projects, which are historically given in the model, and µ
old agents who have no initial wealth.
3 Market Equilibrium and Organizational Choice
3.1 Optimal Contracts
We will ¯rst characterize the optimal contract under each organizational
mode in period t ¸ 1, by taking as given the relevant market prices such as
the interest and wage rates. The optimal contracts o®ered in initial period
t = 0 will be separately examined later.
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In each period each old principal chooses optimal organizational mode,
centralized or decentralized organization, as well as the associated optimal
contract o®ered to skilled workers. In that stage the principals take the
market prices (wt and ½t) as exogenously given because the markets are
perfectly competitive.
First we will start with the optimal contract under C{mode. Suppose
¯rst that old principal wants to implement high e®ort only for one task
of a matched project. Since the probability of the project's outcomes and
e®ort cost function are symmetric with respect to e®ort levels, it does not
matter for which task the principal exerts high e®ort (a = h or ep = h).
In either case the principal incurs e®ort cost cp(h; l) = c > 0. Then the
success probability of the project is given by phl 2 (0; 1). Given wt, ½t+1
and wt+1, period t+ 1 contract CCt+1 under C{mode is o®ered to maximize
the principal's payo® subject to the set of relevant constraints, i.e., it should
solve the following problem:
Problem C
max phl¼(wt+1)¡ c¡ fphlRCt+1 + (1¡ phl)rCt+1g
subject to
(h; l) 2 arg max
i;j=h;l
pij¼(wt+1)¡ cp(i; j)¡ fpijRCt+1 + (1¡ pij)rCt+1g (ICPC)
phlR
C
t+1 + (1¡ phl)rCt+1 + ½t+1wt ¸ wt+1 + ½t+1wt (IRC)
RCt+1 ¸ ¡½t+1wt; rCt+1 ¸ ¡½t+1wt (LLC)
Here (ICPC) says the incentive compatibility constraint for the principal
that she optimally chooses high e®ort only for one task of the project,
given the contract CCt+1. Note here that, since the principal's e®orts are
not veri¯able, she cannot commit herself to her e®ort levels when o®ering
the contract. Thus (ICPC) must be satis¯ed.
(IRC) says the individual rationality constraint that the expected payo®
of skilled worker by accepting the contract CCt+1 (the left hand side) must not
be less than the expected payo® by rejecting it (the right hand side). By our
assumption one old agent (skilled worker) is needed for implementing one
project. Thus (IRC) must be satis¯ed for skilled worker to accept for working
on the project. Each old agent can obtain his interest income ½t+1wt which
comes from his saving, irrespective of accepting the contract. In addition to
this income each old agent can obtain the market wage wt+1 if he will work
as an unskilled worker but not skilled worker. Thus at least the total income
½t+1wt +wt+1 must be guaranteed for ensuring that matched old agent will
accept the contract and work as a skilled worker.
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(LLC) says the limited liability constraint that, since each old agent has
only the income ½t+1wt, the principal cannot make lower payments than this
amount. 9
To solve Problem C, we will ¯rst omit (ICPC) from the problem and
check this later. Then, (IRC) must be binding because otherwise RCt+1
or/and rCt+1 can be slightly reduced and the principal's payo® can be in-
creased. In particular we take RCt+1 = wt+1=phl and r
C
t+1 = 0. Then (ICPC)
will be satis¯ed when
¼(wt+1) ¸ wt+1=phl + (c=¢q) (ICPC0)
and
¼(wt+1) · wt+1=phl + (~c¡ c)=¢p: (ICPC00)
The former says that the principal has no incentives to choose low e®orts
for both tasks and the latter ensures that she has no incentives to choose
high e®orts for both tasks.
We will make the following assumption to ensure that it is too costly for
old principal to exert high e®orts for both tasks of any matched project at
a time:
Assumption 1. (i) Minimum wage (v > 0): wt ¸ v and (ii) ~c¡ c > ¼(v).
Assumption 1(i) says that some minimum wage requirement exists so
that the market wage wt must not be less than the minimum wage v > 0.
However, in what follows we will assume that v is so small and hence the
minimum wage constraint is never binding in any equilibrium. The reason
why we introduced Assumption 1(i) is merely to state Assumption 1(ii) in the
simple manner. Assumption 1(ii) can then guarantee that ~c¡ c > ¼(wt) for
all wt in any equilibrium. Then, given Assumption 1, (ICPC00) is satis¯ed in
any equilibrium. In Appendix B we will also verify that (ICPC0) is satis¯ed
in any equilibrium.
Then the gross payo® the principal can attain in Problem C (gross of
investment cost ¸½t+1) is given by
¦C(wt+1) ´ phl¼(wt+1)¡ wt+1 ¡ c: (2)
9In addition to (LLC) the limited liability constraints on the side of the principal
must be also satis¯ed. The strongest version for these constraints is that the principal's
payments RCt+1 and r
C
t+1 must not be greater than the realized revenues ¼(wt+1) and zero
for each project respectively. Then these constraints are given by ¼(wt+1) ¸ RCt+1 and
0 ¸ rCt+1. However, we can verify that the optimal contract to solve Problem C satis¯es
these constraints. One might also think that since the principal handles many projects
which matched old agents, it is su±cient to consider weaker version for the principal's
limited liability constraints such that total payments cannot be larger than the total
revenues for total matched projects but not per project. However, since the principal's
limited liability constraints are satis¯ed even as the strongest version per project, they
are also satis¯ed by weaker version for total matched projects as well.
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Second, suppose that under C{mode some old principal wants to imple-
ment low e®orts for both tasks of some project. Then, since the principal
must pay at least the market wage wt+1 to the skilled worker who accepts
the contract CCt+1, the maximum gross payo® the principal can obtain by
implementing low e®orts for both tasks is given by
pll¼(wt+1)¡ wt+1:
Thus each old principal never implements low e®orts for both tasks when
¦C(wt+1) ¸ pll¼(wt+1)¡ wt+1 which can be written by
¢q¼(wt+1) ¸ c:
We will assume that this inequality is satis¯ed in any equilibrium, although
we will give su±cient conditions for this in Appendix B.
Third, it is never optimal for any old principal to implement high e®orts
from both tasks of any matched project under Assumption 1.
We will also check later that each project under C{mode can cover the
credit repayment ¸½t+1: ¦C(wt+1) ¸ ¸½t+1 (See (BEC{C) introduced be-
low).
Next we will consider the optimal contract CDt+1 under D{mode o®ered
in period t+ 1.
Suppose ¯rst that each old principal wants to implement high e®orts
a = h and em = h from both tasks of a matched project, one high e®ort
from the matched skilled worker and the other from herself. Then the success
probability of the project is given by phh 2 (0; 1). Also the principal and
skilled worker incur their e®ort costs cp(h) = c > 0 and cm(h) = c > 0
respectively. Then CDt+1 should solve the following problem:
Problem D
max phh¼(wt+1)¡ c¡ fphhRDt+1 + (1¡ phh)rDt+1g
subject to
phhf¼(wt+1)¡RDt+1 + rDt+1g ¡ c ¸ phlf¼(wt+1)¡RDt+1 + rDt+1g (ICPD)
phhR
D
t+1+(1¡phh)rDt+1¡c+½t+1wt ¸ phlRDt+1+(1¡phl)rDt+1+½t+1wt (ICM)
phhR
D
t+1 + (1¡ phh)rDt+1 ¡ c+ ½t+1wt ¸ ½t+1wt + wt+1 (IRD)
RDt+1 ¸ ¡½t+1wt; rDt+1 ¸ ¡½t+1wt (LLD)
Here (IRD) and (LLD) mean the individual rationality and limited liabil-
ity constraints of skilled worker again. 10 Here (ICM) and (ICPD) mean
10As we have discussed in footnote 9, the limited liability constraints on the side of the
principal are ignored here because they are satis¯ed at the optimal solution.
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the incentive compatibility constraints on the side of skilled worker and the
old principal respectively: Both of them can ensure that high e®ort pair
(a; em) = (h; h) can be a Nash equilibrium in the game in which the skilled
worker and old principal simultaneously choose their e®orts, given the con-
tract CDt+1.
As in the case of C{mode, we will ¯rst omit the incentive compatibility
constraint for the principal (ICPD) and check this later. Then, if (IRD)
is not binding at the optimum, both (ICM) and the second (LLD) must
be binding: RDt+1 ¡ rDt+1 = c=¢p and rDt+1 = ¡½t+1wt where recall that
¢p ´ phh ¡ phl > 0. This will be actually the case if phh(c=¢p) ¡ c >
½t+1wt + wt+1, which means that skilled worker obtains some rent over the
payo® of his outside opportunity due to limited liability. Otherwise, (IRD)
is binding at the optimum.
This argument leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Suppose that (ICPD) is not binding in Problem D. Then the
optimal contract CDt+1 to solve Problem D is characterized as follows: (i)
RDt+1 = c=¢p¡½t+1wt and rDt+1 = ¡½t+1wt if phh(c=¢p)¡c > ½t+1wt+wt+1
and (ii) phhRDt+1 + (1¡ phh)rDt+1 = wt+1 + c otherwise.
In what follows we will ignore (ICPD), although in Appendix B we will give
the conditions for (ICPD) to be actually satis¯ed.
Then, we derive the gross maximum payo® the principal can attain in
Problem D (gross of investment cost ¸½t+1) as follows:
¦D(wt; wt+1; ½t+1) ´
8<:
phh¼(wt+1)¡ c¡ phh(c=¢p) + ½t+1wt if phh(c=¢p)¡ c > ½t+1wt + wt+1
phh¼(wt+1)¡ wt+1 ¡ 2c otherwise.
(3)
Next suppose that some old principal wants to implement other e®ort
pairs than the high e®ort one for some matched project. Then, by similar
argument to the case of C{mode, the maximum payo® the principal can
obtain by implementing other e®ort pairs than (a; em) = (h; h) is given by
¦¤(wt+1) ´ maxfpll¼(wt+1)¡ wt+1; phl¼(wt+1)¡ wt+1 ¡ cg:
Thus it is optimal for each old principal to implement high e®ort pair
(a; em) = (h; h) when
¦D(wt; wt+1; ½t+1) ¸ ¦¤(wt+1): (4)
Again we will assume throughout the main text that this inequality holds
in any equilibrium, although we will verify this in Appendix B.
We will also check later that each project under D{mode can cover the
credit repayment ¸½t+1: ¦D(wt; wt+1; ½t+1) ¸ ¸½t+1 (See condition (BEC{
D) introduced below).
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Each old principal compares the payo®s (2) and (3) under di®erent or-
ganizational modes. Then each old principal will choose D{mode only if
¦D(wt; wt+1; ½t+1) ¸ ¦C(wt+1); (5)
but C{mode only if
¦C(wt+1) ¸ ¦D(wt; wt+1; ½t+1); (6)
given the market prices wt, wt+1 and ½t+1. Furthermore, when ¦D(wt; wt+1; ½t+1) =
¦C(wt+1), old principals will be indi®erent for choosing D{mode and C{
mode.
We will ¯nally derive the optimal contracts in initial period t = 0. In ini-
tial period t = 0 old agents are assumed to be have ¯xed wealth, normalized
to zero. Again we assume that each old principal wants to implement high
e®orts for both tasks of any matched project. Thus the optimal contract
CD0 = fRD0 ; rD0 g under D{mode in period 0 should solve the following:
Problem D0
max phh[¼(w0)¡RD0 ] + (1¡ phh)[¡rD0 ]¡ c
subject to (ICPD), (ICM) and
phhR
D
0 + (1¡ phh)rD0 ¡ c ¸ w0; (IRD0)
RD0 ¸ 0; rD0 ¸ 0: (LLD0)
This problem di®ers from those in other periods only in that old agents have
no wealth initial period and thus they can obtain only the market wage w0
when they reject the contract. By this reason, the individual rationality
constraint (IRD0) and the limited liability constraint (LLD0) were changed.
Then the optimal contract to solve Problem D0 should be given as fol-
lows: R0 = c=¢p and r0 = 0 if phh(c=¢p)¡c > w0 and phhR0+(1¡phh)r0 =
w0+c otherwise. Thus, in initial period (t = 0) the gross (per project) payo®
of old principal under D{mode becomes
¦D0 (w0) ´
8<:
phh¼(w0)¡ c¡ phh(c=¢p) if phh(c=¢p)¡ c > w0
phh¼(w0)¡ w0 ¡ 2c otherwise.
(7)
Next we consider the optimal C{mode contract in initial period t = 0.
By Assumption 1, any old principal never exerts high e®orts for both tasks
of any matched project. Also we assume that it is optimal for each old
principal to implement high e®ort only for one task of any matched project
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as in the case of other periods (t ¸ 1). Then, the gross payo® each old
principal can obtain per project under C{mode is given by
¦C0 (w0) ´ phl¼(w0)¡ w0 ¡ c: (8)
Thus each old principal will choose D{mode in period 0 only if ¦D0 (w0) ¸
¦C0 (w0). In contrast to other periods only the market wage w0 determines
the equilibrium organizational mode in initial period (t = 0).
3.2 Labor Market Equilibrium
The labor demand in period t is totally given by g(wt)phhm(Kt; µ) when all
old principals choose D{mode in period t. This is because m(Kt; µ) projects
are matched with µ old agents and phh fraction of them succeeds, each of
which requires labor demand g(wt). When all old principals choose C{mode,
total labor demand is given by g(wt)phlm(Kt; µ) because each project owned
by the principals will succeed with probability phl 2 (0; 1). Of course, when
D{mode yields strictly higher (resp. lower) payo® ¦D(wt; wt+1; ½t+1) than
C{mode ¦C(wt+1) does, all old principals will choose D{mode (resp. C{
mode) with certainty. When old principals obtain the same payo® under
both C{mode and D{mode, they will be indi®erent between these modes,
and hence in this case we suppose that xt 2 [0; 1] fraction of them will choose
D{mode.
On the other hand, labor supply comes from all µ young agents and
the old agents who failed to match the projects, µ(1¡ ¯(Kt)). All of them,
µ+µ(1¡¯(K)), supply their labor inputs to work as unskilled workers. Thus,
recalling that we denoted by xt 2 [0; 1] the fraction of the old principals
choosing D{mode in period t, the labor market will clear in period t when
fxtphh + (1¡ xt)phlgg(wt)m(Kt; µ) = µ + µ(1¡ ¯(Kt)): (LMC)
Since g0 < 0, we can derive a unique market clearing wage to solve the above
equation. In particular we will denote by wt = wD(Kt) the market clearing
wage for xt = 1 (when all old principals choose D{mode) and by wt =
wC(Kt) the market clearing wage for xt = 0 (when all old principals choose
C{mode) respectively. Since ¯ is increasing in Kt, the market wages wD
and wC are both increasing in Kt. Since phh > phl, we also have wD(K) >
wC(K) for all K.
Note here that, since m(K; µ) · µ for all K ¸ 0, and phh > phl, (LMC)
implies that g(wt) ¸ 1=phh which then shows wt · g¡1(1=phh) where g¡1 is
the inverse function of g. This shows that the market wage must be bounded
above by g¡1(1=phh) in any equilibrium.
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3.3 Credit Market Equilibrium
Suppose that all old principals in period t+1 will choose D{mode. Then in
period t the following break even condition for each young principal must
be satis¯ed:
®(Kt+1)¦D(wt; wt+1; ½t+1) = ¸½t+1: (BEC{D)
Here the left hand side means the expected payo® of a young principal per
project in period t because she can match an old agent with probability
®(Kt+1) and obtain the gross payo® ¦D(wt; wt+1; ½t+1) in the next period
t+1. The right hand side means the cost of raising one project (recall that
¸ goods are needed to create one project). If the left (resp. right) hand
side of the above inequality is greater than the right (resp. left) hand side,
each young principal will require in¯nite (resp. zero) credit demand, which
will not make the credit market clear. Thus the above equality must hold
in credit market equilibrium.
Similarly, when all old principals choose C{mode, the following break
even condition must hold:
®(Kt+1)¦C(wt+1) = ¸½t+1: (BEC{C)
When each old principal is indi®erent for choosing between D{mode and
C{mode, she must obtain the same expected payo® ¦D(wt; wt+1; ½t+1) =
¦C(wt+1) under both modes. This case can be thus included in the above
break even condition (BEC{D) or (BEC{C).
In credit market equilibrium the total credit demand (total investment)
must be also equal to the total credit supply (total saving):
µwt = ¸Kt+1: (9)
Here the total saving comes from µ young agents who will save all their
wage incomes wt. The total investment comes from one unit mass of young
principals who need ¸ goods per project to be ¯nanced.
Note that (BEC{D) and ®(Kt+1) < 1 imply ¦D(wt; wt+1; ½t+1) > ¸½t+1.
This shows that each project under D{mode can cover the credit repayment
¸½t+1 after matching but before projects' outcomes are realized.11 The same
argument can be applied to C{mode.
3.4 Equilibrium Organizations
Given the market wage wt determined in the previous period, say t, we
de¯ne the static equilibrium in the current period (t+1) which consists of the
11Since each old principal handles many projects, she can perfectly diversify the risks
of the projects' failure due to the law of large numbers. Thus her expected payo® per
project can be viewed as her average one and hence the actual revenues of all her projects
can cover her total credit repayments.
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number of total projectsKt+1, the market wage rate wt+1, the organizational
mode, and the interest rate ½t+1. In the static equilibrium D{mode emerges
in period t + 1 when (5), (LMC) with xt+1 = 1, (BEC{D) and (9) are all
satis¯ed. We will call this D{mode equilibrium. On the other hand, C{mode
emerges in period t+ 1 when (6), (LMC) with xt+1 = 0, (BEC{C) and (9)
are all satis¯ed. We will call this C{mode equilibrium. Furthermore, when
¦D(wt; wt+1; ½t+1) = ¦C(wt+1), (LMC) with some xt+1 2 (0; 1), (BEC{D)
(or (BEC{C)) and (9) will give an equilibrium in which both C{mode and
D{mode co{exist. We will call this mixed mode equilibrium.
Then, in order to see which type of the static equilibrium arises, we
de¯ne the following functions:
½^D(wt+1;Kt+1) ´ ®(Kt+1)
¸(1¡ ¯(Kt+1))fphh¼(wt+1)¡ c¡ phh(c=¢p)g; (10)
~½D(wt+1;Kt+1) ´ ®(Kt+1)
¸
fphh¼(wt+1)¡ wt+1 ¡ 2cg; (11)
½C(wt+1;Kt+1) ´ ®(Kt+1)
¸
fphl¼(wt+1)¡ wt+1 ¡ cg: (12)
By using (9) and ®(Kt+1)Kt+1=µ = ¯(Kt+1), we can readily verify that
½^D means the interest rate to ensure the break even condition (BEC{D) of
each young principal in period t, provided D{mode will be chosen and (IRD)
will not be binding in period t+1. ~½D is the interest rate to ensure the break
even condition (BEC{D), provided D{mode will be chosen and (IRD) will
be binding in period t + 1. ~½C means the interest rate which ensures the
break even condition (BEC{C), provided C{mode will be chosen in period
t + 1. Then, in order to ensure that these interest rates are all positive,
we must have phh¼(wt+1) ¡ phh(c=¢p) ¡ c > 0, phl¼(wt+1) ¡ wt+1 ¡ c > 0
and phh¼(wt+1) ¡ wt+1 ¡ 2c > 0. To this end we will make the following
assumption:
Assumption 2. ¼(g¡1(1=phh)) > maxf(g¡1(1=phh) + 2c)=phh; c=¢p +
c=phhg.
Since the market wage wt+1 is bounded above by g¡1(1=phh) in any equi-
librium as we have noted before, Assumption 2 can guarantee the following:
First, ¼(w) > c=¢p and hence ~½D(w;K) > ½C(w;K) in any equilibrium.
Second, all ½C(w;K), ~½D(w;K) and ½^D(w;K) are positive in any equilib-
rium.
By de¯ning the following functions:
¡(w;K) ´ ½^D(w;K)¡ ½C(w;K); (13)
and
©(w;K) ´ ½^D(w;K)¡ ~½D(w;K); (14)
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we can show the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Given K, if ¡(w;K) = 0 has solutions for w, its number is
generically two. Also, given K, if ©(w;K) = 0 has solutions for w, its
number is generically two.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since ¡(w;K) > ©(w;K) for all w and all K by Assumption 2, ©(w;K)
has solutions as long as ¡(w;K) does so. Let w(K) and w(K) denote these
solutions to ¡(w;K) = 0 for w, given K, where w(¢) > w(¢). Then, we can
verify that w (resp. w) is decreasing (resp. increasing) in K. Let also denote
by w¤(K) and w¤¤(K) the two solutions of w to the equation ©(w;K) = 0
for a given K, where w¤(K) < w¤¤(K) for all K. Again, w¤ is increasing
but w¤¤ is decreasing. Since ¡(w;K) > ©(w;K) for all w, we also have
w¤(K) < w(K) < w(K) < w¤¤(K) for all K ¸ 0.
Now we can show the following result:
Proposition 1. Suppose that wt is given (t ¸ 0). Suppose also that
¡(wt+1;Kt+1) = 0 has the solutions of wt+1 for a given Kt+1 = (µ=¸)wt.
Then the static equilibrium in period t+ 1 is characterized as follows:
(i) C{mode equilibrium emerges if and only if wt+1 and Kt+1 satisfy
Kt+1 = (µ=¸)wt; (15)
wt+1 2 [w(Kt+1); w(Kt+1)]; (16)
wt+1 = wC(Kt+1) (17)
(ii) D{mode equilibrium emerges if and only if wt+1 and Kt+1 satisfy
Kt+1 = (µ=¸)wt; (18)
wt+1 2 (0; w(Kt+1)] [ [w(Kt+1);1) (19)
wt+1 = wD(Kt+1) (20)
(iii) Mixed mode equilibrium emerges if and only if
Kt+1 = (µ=¸)wt; (21)
wt+1 2 fw(Kt+1); w(Kt+1)g (22)
respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Although the formal proof for Proposition 1 is relegated to Appendix
A, the intuition behind this result can be understood as follows: Roughly
speaking, the reservation payo® of skilled worker ½t+1wt + wt+1, which he
could obtain if he rejected the contract o®ered by matched principal and
worked as an unskilled worker, is U{shaped with respect to the market wage
wt+1 in period t+1, given the previous period wage wt (See Figure 1). When
wt+1 is large, this directly raises the opportunity cost of working as a skilled
worker instead of an unskilled worker. When wt+1 is small, such opportunity
cost also rises because the pro¯t of successful project ¼(wt+1) becomes larger
and hence the equilibrium interest rate ½t+1 must go up in order to satisfy
the credit market equilibrium. Hence, by recalling that (IRD) is binding
under D{mode when phh(c=¢p) ¡ c · ½t+1wt + wt+1, (IRD) is more likely
to be binding when the market wage wt+1 becomes larg or small. Since the
trade{o® between incentive and rent extraction becomes less serious when
(IRD) is more likely to be binding, D{mode becomes more pro¯table for
each old principal than C{mode when wt+1 is either large or small. This
means that D{mode emerges as an equilibrium when the market wage wt+1
in period t+ 1 is large or small, given the previous period wage wt.
In initial period t = 0 the argument should be modi¯ed as follows: Re-
call that the maximum gross payo®s of initial old principals under D{mode
and C{mode are given by ¦D(w0) and ¦C(w0) respectively. The only dif-
ference from any other period t ¸ 1 is that the maximum payo® of old
principal under D{mode is changed from phh¼(wt)¡ c¡phh(c=¢p)+½t+1wt
to phh¼(w0) ¡ c ¡ phh(c=¢p) when (IRD0) is not binding in Problem D0.
Thus, when (IRD0) is not binding, the payo® di®erence ¦D(w0) ¡ ¦C(w0)
between D{mode and C{mode becomes
(phh ¡ phl)¼(w0)¡ phh(c=¢p) + w0;
which is the same as the function ¡ we have de¯ned for other periods (t ¸ 1)
once we set ¯(Kt) ´ 0 or equivalently Kt ´ 0. Thus we can show that for
all w0 2 (w(0); w(0)) we have ¦C(w0) > ¦D(w0) but ¦D(w0) ¸ ¦C(w0)
for all w0 2 (0; w(0)] [ [w(0);1). Then D{mode equilibrium emerges in
initial period if w0 2 (0; w(0)] [ [w(0);1) and the labor market clears,
i.e., phhg(w0)m(K0; µ) = µ + (1 ¡ ¯(K0))µ. Here the initial value K0 is
historically given. On the other hand, C{mode equilibrium emerges in ini-
tial period if w0 2 (w(0); w(0)) holds and the labor market clears, i.e.,
phlg(w0)m(K0; µ) = µ + (1¡ ¯(K0))µ. Also, mixed mode equilibrium arises
in initial period when w0 = w(0) or w0 = w(0).
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4 Equilibrium Dynamics
As we have shown, if they exist, the two cuto® market wages w(K) and
w(K), which determine the equilibrium organizational mode, are decreasing
and increasing in K respectively. In Figure 2 we depicted these two curves
and the di®erent regions, labeled by D1, C and D2. The shaded area, labeled
by C, means the set of pairs (w;K) such that C{mode equilibrium emerges
while in all other areas, labeled by D1 and D2, D{mode equilibrium emerges.
Furthermore, on the boundaries of the curves w(K) and w(K), mixed mode
equilibria arise where old principals are indi®erent between C{mode and
D{mode as we have shown in Proposition 1.
A can be seen in Figure 2, both D{mode and C{mode static equilibria
may arise for the same number of projects K because the market wage
wD(Kt) under D{mode belongs to region D1 as well as the wage wC(Kt)
under C{mode belongs to region C even when the economy has the same
number of projects Kt. Also, mixed mode equilibrium can co{exist together
with C{mode and D{mode static equilibria: Given the same Kt, the market
wage w(Kt) satis¯es the labor market clearing condition (LMC) and thus
some xt 2 (0; 1) fraction of old principals choose D{mode while 1¡xt fraction
of them choose C{mode. This fraction xt can be determined by (LMC) as
well. Such mixed mode equilibrium is depicted as point M in Figure 2. Thus
for the same value of Kt there may exist three possible static equilibria, i.e.,
C{mode, D{mode and mixed mode equilibria.
Note that the market wage wC(K) (resp. wD(K)) must belong to the
corresponding region, C (resp. D1 or D2) when C{mode (resp. D{mode)
equilibrium arises. Note also that in a mixed mode equilibrium the market
wage must be w(K) or w(K). Then we can derive the entire equilibrium
market wage which is a function of the number of total projectsKt as follows:
w¤(Kt) ´
8>><>>:
wC(Kt) if wC(Kt) 2 (w(Kt); w(Kt)),
wD(Kt) if wD(Kt) 2 [0; w(Kt)) [ (w(Kt);1)
w(Kt) if w(Kt) 2 [wC(Kt); wD(Kt)],
w(Kt) if w(Kt) 2 [wC(Kt); wD(Kt)].
(23)
Given this wage function w¤(K), we can characterize the equilibrium dy-
namics which governs the path of the number of created projects fKtg1t=0
which satis¯es the credit market clearing condition (9) as well as (23):
Kt+1 = (µ=¸)w¤(Kt): (24)
We will here make the following assumption:
Assumption 3. w0i(0) = +1, i = C;D.
Assumption 3 will be satis¯ed in the following example: F (L) = L´, where
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´ 2 (0; 1), and ¯0(0) > 0. In this example we can show that dwi=dKjK=0 =
´(1¡ ´)2´¡1z1¡´¯0(0)¯(0)¡´ = +1 for z = phh when i = D (resp. z = phl
when i = C).
Then we can de¯ne the steady state value of K in D{mode equilibrium,
called the D{mode steady state and denoted KD, as
µwD(KD) = ¸KD
and the steady state value of K in C{mode equilibrium, called C{mode
steady state and denoted KC , as
µwC(KC) = ¸KC :
By Assumption 3 and the fact that wi(K) · g¡1(1=phh) for allK, there exist
the steady state values KD and KC for all ¸ > 0. To avoid complication,
we will assume that the steady state Ki uniquely exists for each i = D;C.
Note here that KD > KC holds because wD(K) > wC(K) for all K > 0.
The properties of equilibrium dynamics (24) depend on the parameter
value ¸ which captures the costs of investing and starting up a project.
As we have mentioned, ¸ may measure both technological and institutional
ine±ciencies underlying the economy when starting up a project. We can
also give further interpretation of ¸ as the measure of contracting costs
of ¯nance in credit market by extending the basic model to allow default
possibility (See Appendix C for more details).
We will ¯rst consider the case that the investment cost ¸ is so small.
Then the economy eventually converges to the D{mode steady state KD.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumption 1{3 hold. Suppose also that
the investment cost ¸ is su±ciently small. Then the economy eventually
converges to the D{mode steady state, i.e., Kt ! KD as t!1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
When the investment cost ¸ is small enough, the number of created
projectsKt becomes much larger. Then the market equilibrium wage wi(Kt)
is pushed up under both D{mode and C{mode (i = D;C). Thus, as the
economy grows, it must enter the region in which the market wage is large
enough and hence the rent of skilled workers becomes small enough as well.
This means that D{mode becomes optimal choice forever from some period
onward. Thus, in this case there are no diversities of organizational modes
to govern transactions in the long run.
One implication of this result is as follows: When the institutions under-
lying the economy are developed well so that it becomes cheaper for young
principals to raise the fund and start up projects, ¸ becomes smaller. Then
Proposition 2 suggests that decentralization is more likely to be dominant
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form and the economy is more likely to enjoy the bene¯ts from specialization
when well developed institutions emerge to reduce the costs of starting up
the projects.
Next we will turn to more interesting case that the investment cost ¸
is moderately large. To make the analysis interesting, we will impose the
following assumption:
Assumption 4. (i) minw¸0 ¡(w;1) < 0, and (ii) g¡1(¾=phl) > w(1)
where ¾ ´ (2¡ °)=°.
Assumption 4(i) ensures that the two cuto® wages w(K) and w(K) actu-
ally exist for allK ¸ 0. This is because ¡(w;K) is increasing inK and hence
minw ¡(w;1) < 0 implies minw ¡(w;K) < 0 for all K ¸ 0. Then, by de¯ni-
tion of ¡(w;K), we have two solutions of w to the equation ¡(w;K) = 0 for a
givenK, due to Lemma 2. Thus there exists the region in which C{mode be-
comes a static equilibrium (labeled by C in Figure 2). Assumption 4(i) also
implies that w(K) and w(K) exist for all K ¸ 0 and hence w(1) = w(1)
exists. Assumption 4(ii) then guarantees that these cuto® curves w(K) and
w(K) intersect with the market wage curves wC(K) and wC(K) correspond-
ing to D{mode and C{mode respectively (as depicted in Figure 2). This is
because wD(K) > wC(K) for all K and limK!1wC(K) = g¡1(¾=phl) by
limK!1m(K; µ) = °µ. In Appendix B we will give the parametric condi-
tions for Assumption 4 to be satis¯ed and consistent with other assumptions
we have made.
Given Assumption 4, we will consider the range of the investment cost
parameter values ¸ such that wC(KC) 2 (w(KC); w(KC)) and wD(KD) >
w(KD) are satis¯ed. Then, as depicted in Figure 4, there exist multiple
equilibrium paths some of which converge to the C{mode steady state KC
but others of which converge to the D{mode steady state KD even when
the economy starts from the same initial value K0. To see that this is
actually the case, we de¯ne the values of K, denoted K 0 and K 00, such that
wC(K 0) = w(K 0) and K 00 ´ maxfK > 0 j wC(K 00) = w(K 00)g. 12
Then we can show the following result:
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumption 1{4 hold. Then there exists some
range of the investment cost parameter ¸, denoted (¸; ¸), such that for all
¸ 2 (¸; ¸) the following statements hold: (i) If K0 2 (K 00;K 0), then multiple
equilibrium paths arise, some of which converge to the D{mode steady state
KD and others of which converge to the C{mode steady state KC . (ii) If
K0 ¸ K 0, then there exist no equilibria which converge to the C{mode steady
state KC .
12Since w(0) > wC(0) = 0 and Assumption 4, such K
00 is well{de¯ned. In Figure 2 and
3 we assume that such K00 is unique to simplify argument.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 states that the economy may be diverted into di®erent
development phases, which are characterized by di®erent organizational
modes, even when it starts from the same economic condition. If all the
principals expect higher economic growth (and hence higher market wage),
D{mode becomes more pro¯table for them than C{mode as we have seen
in Proposition 1. Since D{mode is more productive than C{mode in the
sense that it can exploit the bene¯ts from specialization of tasks (note that
phh > phl), production and hence employment levels are expanded when all
the principals choose D{mode. This in turn pushes up the labor demand
and thus the market equilibrium wage, which actually ful¯lls the principals'
original expectation. Thus D{mode can be an equilibrium. On the other
hand, if all the principals expect lower economic growth (and hence lower
market wage), C{mode becomes more pro¯table for them than D{mode,
which actually makes the market wage lower. Thus the principals' original
expectation is ful¯lled again and thus C{mode becomes an equilibrium as
well. Which development path, the path converging to the D{mode steady
state or the C{mode steady state, the economy will eventually reach depends
on the expectation held by the principals.
The equilibrium paths we have shown above eventually converge to ei-
ther the D{mode steady state or the C{mode steady state in the long run.
Thus, although equilibrium paths are not unique, each long run steady state
corresponds to a unique organizational mode, one for D{mode and the other
for C{mode. This result will be useful for understanding why di®erent coun-
tries are sometimes characterized by di®erent organizational modes: Di®er-
ent countries might be on di®erent equilibrium paths converging to di®erent
steady states. However, diversity of organizational modes to govern transac-
tions is observed not only across countries but also even in the same country
and same industry (See Berger (2005)). To address this issue, we show that
there exists the mixed steady state in which both C{mode and D{mode
co{exist together. These steady states are de¯ned as
µw(KM ) = ¸KM ;
and
µw(Km) = ¸Km:
Here KM > Km holds (See Figure 5). Since w(0) > 0 and w(K) is bounded
above, the steady state Km exists. Also, since w is decreasing in K, there
also exists the steady state KM as well.
First, when ¸ is large, there exists a low mixed steady state Km where
Km < KC as well as some equilibrium path converging to such steady state
(See Figure 5). In this equilibrium path the number of total projects is
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low and the resulting market wage is low as well. Second, when ¸ is in
the moderate range, a high mixed steady state KM exists where KM >
KC (See point M in Figure 5). Since the equilibrium wage curve w(Kt) is
decreasing and the curve of credit demand ¸Kt is increasing, there may exist
equilibrium path which °uctuates around high mixed steady state KM and
eventually converges to it in the long run ( as shown in Figure 6). Then
the mixed steady state can be attained and hence co{existence of di®erent
organizations persists even in the long run.
Proposition 4. There exists some range of the investment cost parameter
¸ for which the mixed steady states exist in which both C{mode and D{mode
co{exist. Furthermore, there may exist an equilibrium path which °uctuates
around the high mixed steady state KM and converges to it in the long run.
Proposition 4 shows the possibility that the economy exhibits endoge-
nous °uctuation due to the endogenous non{monotonic change of the com-
position of organizational modes: The fractions of D{mode in the economy
°uctuate over time. Furthermore, depending on the costs of starting up
project ¸, there may exist multiple mixed steady states, Km and KM , which
di®er each other in terms of the fractions of the principals choosing D{mode.
In Figure 7 we depicted such situation where there also exist multiple equi-
librium paths some of which converge to the low mixed steady state Km but
others of which converge to the high mixed steady state KM even from the
same initial condition.
We will ¯nally comment on the welfare property of di®erent steady
states. We de¯ne the social welfare of this economy in a steady state as
the sum of all individuals' payo®s in each generation (the Benthamian wel-
fare). All individuals obtain utilities from their old period consumption. The
total consumption of all old principals and old agents in each generation is
given by the total output F (g(w))[xphh + (1¡ x)phl]m(K; µ) they generate
from matched projects minus total wage paid to young workers in the next
generation µw. Since µw = ¸K, this payment is equal to the investment
cost incurred by the principals in each generation. Here x 2 [0; 1] denotes
the fraction of old principals choosing D{mode in a steady state. Also, to-
tal e®ort costs in a generation under C{mode are given by c because only
old principal exerts high e®ort only for one task of each matched project.
Under D{mode both old principal and skilled worker exert high e®orts for
both tasks of each matched project, and hence the total e®ort costs in a
generation is given by 2c.
Let denote by wC ´ wC(KC) and wD ´ wD(KD) the equilibrium wages
in the C{mode and D{mode steady states. Then the sum of the utilities of
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all individuals in each generation is given by
V D ´ F (g(wD))phhm(KD; µ)¡m(KD; µ)2c¡ µwD (25)
in the D{mode steady state and
V C ´ F (g(wC))phlm(KC ; µ)¡m(KC ; µ)c¡ µwC (26)
in the C{mode steady state respectively.
Which V D or V C is larger depends on the two opposite e®ects: Since
KD > KC , more projects are ¯nanced in the D{mode steady state than
the C{mode steady state. This gives larger number of successful projects
in the D{mode steady state than the C{mode steady state. On the other
hand, since wD > wC , the cost{rising e®ect arises under D{mode. First,
the output per successful project becomes lower in the D{mode steady state
than the C{mode steady state. Second, the investment cost µwD in the
D{mode steady state becomes larger than the C{mode steady state, µwC .
When the former project expansion e®ect dominates the latter cost{rising
e®ect, the D{mode steady state attains higher welfare than the C{mode
steady state. However, when the latter dominates the former, the ranking
of the long run welfare in these steady states is reversed.
Although it is di±cult to derive general conclusions on the welfare com-
parison, we can give some parametric example to show that more decentral-
ization yields larger steady state welfare than less decentralization:
Example. Suppose that F (L) = AL´ where ´ 2 (0; 1) and A > 0. Let
K = K(m) denote the inverse function of m = m(K; µ). Then we have
K(0) = K 0(0) = 0 and limm!° K(m) = 1 under our assumptions. Under
this speci¯cation we can derive the steady state welfare under D{mode as
follows:
V D(m) ´ Ap1¡´hh (2µ ¡m)´m1¡´ ¡ 2cm¡ ¸K(m)
for m = mD ´ m(KD) and the welfare under C{mode as follows:
V C(m) ´ Ap1¡´hl (2µ ¡m)´m1¡´ ¡ cm¡ ¸K(m)
for m = mC ´ m(KC) respectively. Then we obtain that wD = A´(2µ ¡
mD=phm
D)´¡1 and µwD = ¸K(mD). Here note that mD > mC by KD >
KC . Under our assumptions, the equilibrium value mD tends to be zero
when ´ goes to zero. Similarly, mC tends to be zero as ´ goes to zero.
Also, by letting f(m) ´ V D(m) ¡ V C(m), we can show that f(0) = 0 and
f 0(0) = +1. 13 Then V D(m) > V C(m) holds for all small m, and hence we
have V D = V D(mD) > V C(mD) > V C(mC) = V C when ´ is small enough
13In fact we can derive f(m) = A[p1¡´hh ¡p1¡´hl ](2µ¡m)´m1¡´¡cm and hence f 0(0) = +1
due to phh > phl.
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because both mC and mD are small and mD > mC when ´ is small. This
shows that the steady state welfare V C under D{mode become higher than
that under C{mode V C when ´ is small enough.
Furthermore the social welfare in the high mixed steady state (K = KM )
is given by
VM (m) ´ A[xphh+(1¡x)phl]1¡´(2µ¡m)m1¡´¡ [x2c+(1¡x)c]m¡¸K(m)
for m = mM where mM is de¯ned by K(mM ) = KM . VM (m) lies between
V D(m) and V C(m) for all m. Thus, since mC < mM < mD, we also have
V D(mD) > VM (mM ) > V C(mC) when ´ is small enough. This shows that
the steady states with more decentralization attains higher social welfare
than those with less decentralization.
5 Implications
5.1 Outsourcing vs. Vertical Integration
In this subsection we discuss the implications of the model about contracting
choices of intermediate inputs, i.e., outsourcing and vertical integration. In
contrast to the basic model, we assume that there are two types of goods,
one ¯nal good and one intermediate input. The principals are the ¯nal good
manufactures and one unit of the ¯nal good can be produced by using one
unit of the intermediate input. The ¯nal good manufacturers can create the
projects when they are young. These projects will yield stochastic returns
when they are old by using the intermediate inputs. The output of the
intermediate input Y is produced by the production function Y = F (L)
by using labor L. Each old agent is the intermediate input producer who
initially owns the technology or knowledge to develop the intermediate input.
The projects created by the ¯nal good manufacturers are randomly
matched with the intermediate input producers. The intermediate input
is not traded in the market but its trading and payment decisions are made
by bilateral bargaining between the ¯nal good manufacturer and the inter-
mediate input producer who matched the project owned by the ¯nal good
manufacturer.
For each matched project there are two tasks to be completed, one for
\input development" and the other for \output development:" To enter the
production process of ¯nal good and intermediate input, both the input and
the ¯nal good must be developed by ex ante e®orts. These two tasks corre-
spond to task 1 and task 2 in the basic model. We assume that the output
development can be carried out only by the ¯nal good manufacturers. How-
ever the input development can be handled by either the input producer or
the ¯nal good manufacturer. We here assume that the party who developed
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the input can access to the production technology of the input. 14
Then each ¯nal good manufacturer has two options for handling the
input development: One is to keep the arm's length transaction with the
input producer who owns the technology to develop the input and hence
produces the input. This is called outsourcing. The other option is to
buy the technology of the input development from the input producer and
produce the intermediate input by herself. This is called vertical integration.
Extending the basic model in this way, decentralized organization (resp.
centralized organization) which we have de¯ned in the basic model corre-
sponds to the mode of contracting choice as outsourcing (resp. vertical
integration). Then Proposition 1 gives a prediction that outsourcing be-
comes dominant in well developed countries with smaller costs of setting
up the projects such as smaller contracting costs and less regulations. This
prediction might be consistent with the recent ¯nding by Acemoglu, John-
son and Mitton (2005, 2007). Proposition 3 also suggests that both vertical
integration and outsourcing emerge as organizational modes to govern the
productions of intermediate inputs even in the similar economies. This might
explain the stylized fact that contracting modes of intermediate inputs are
di®erent across countries. 15
5.2 Decentralization and Economic Development
Our result also shows that the steady state with centralized organization cor-
responds to smaller economic development in terms of the number of total
projectsKC than the steady state with decentralized organizationKD. This
might suggest the testable implication that organizational modes to govern
transactions become more centralized and integrated in less developed coun-
tries. Kahnna and Palepu (1997, 2000) provide supportable evidence for this
and found that group a±liated ¯rms which are based on common ownership
and control outperform focused, una±liated ¯rms in emerging markets such
as India.
Also, as Chandler (1962) has extensively analyzed in his famous book,
in the late 19th century U.S. ¯rms became bigger through vertical integra-
tion and changed their corporate structures in the centralized way known as
U{form (unitary form). However, as the U.S. market was expanded through
increasing connections of railway networks, in the early 20th century the
U.S. big ¯rms shifted their corporate structures from U{form to more de-
centralized form known as M{form (multidivisional form). Since top man-
agement had incurred large overload costs under U{form when the market
was expanded, the U.S. big ¯rms were forced to be restructured toward more
decentralization such as M{form. This U.S. business history might be con-
14This may be because the party who developed the input can own some knowledge and
skills which are necessary for the production of the input.
15See for example Berger (2005) for recent evidence.
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sistent with our result that organizational modes become more decentralized
to pursue the gains from specialization as the market size is expanded.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed the dynamic general equilibrium frame-
work to investigate how organizations change the modes to govern trans-
actions and how such organizational change leads to endogenous process
of economic development. Then we have argued that specialization or di-
vision of labor makes decentralized organization advantageous while it is
limited by the agency problem caused by asymmetric information in orga-
nizations. We have shown how centralized and decentralized organizations
emerge in the economy and how they dynamically interact with the mar-
ket equilibrium conditions. Depending on the ¯nancing cost underlying the
economy, equilibrium organizational mode becomes centralized and decen-
tralized. Furthermore, there exist multiple equilibrium paths some of which
converge to the steady state with decentralized organization and others of
which converge to the steady state with centralized organization. We have
also shown that such endogenous choice of organizational modes causes en-
dogenous °uctuation of the economy such as business cycles.
7 Appendix A
7.1 Proof of Lemma 2
¡(w;K) = 0 can be written by·
phh
1¡ ¯(K) ¡ phl
¸
¼(w) + w ¡ c
·
1
1¡ ¯(K)
µ
phh
¢p
+ 1
¶
¡ 1
¸
= 0:
Since ¼ is convex function with ¼(0) =1 and ¼(1) = 0, the number of the
solutions for w to the above equation is generically two, given K.
Similarly ©(w;K) = 0 generically has two solutions of w, given K.
Q.E.D.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To save notation, we will denote K ´ Kt+1, ½ ´ ½t+1 and w ´ wt+1. We
will also use the fact wt = (¸=µ)Kt+1.
Given K, both ½^D(w;K) and ~½D(w;K) coincide with each other at a
point w if and only if
phh(c=¢p)¡ c = ½^D(w;K)(¸=µ)K + w:
As we have seen in Lemma 2, there are two such points w, denoted w¤(K)
and w¤¤(K), and we obtain ~½D(w;K) > ½^D(w;K) if and only if w 2
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(w¤(K); w¤¤(K)). Furthermore, since both ~½D and ½^D are decreasing and
convex functions of w, we have
phh(c=¢p)¡ c ¸ ½(¸=µ)K + w
for any (w; ½) such that ½ = maxf½^D(w;K); ~½D(w;K)g and w 2 (w¤(K); w¤¤(K))
while
phh(c=¢p)¡ c < ½(¸=µ)K + w
for any (w; ½) such that ½ = minf~½D(w;K); ½^D(w;K)g and w 2 (0; w¤(K))[
(w¤¤(K);1). Thus, if D{mode becomes an equilibrium and (IRD) is not
binding, then w 2 (w¤(K); w¤¤(K)) and ½ = ½^D(w;K) must be satis¯ed.
Also, if D{mode becomes an equilibrium and (IRD) is binding, then w 2
(0; w¤(K)) [ (w¤¤(K);1) and ½ = ~½D(w;K) must be satis¯ed.
Furthermore, since ½C(w;K) < ~½D(w;K) for all w and K due to As-
sumption 2, we always have the relation that w¤(K) < w(K) < w(K) <
w¤¤(K) for any K.
Note also that, since ¸ > ®(K)(¸=µ)K = ¸¯(K), we have ½ > (<)
½^D(w;K) if and only if
®(K)fphh¼(w)¡ c¡ phh(c=¢p) + ½(¸=µ)Kg < (>)¸½: (*)
(i) Su±ciency Part: Now take an interest rate ½ = ½C(w;K) and the market
wage w = wC(K) such that w 2 [w(K); w(K)], given K = (µ=¸)wt. Then,
since w 2 [w(K); w(K)] implies w 2 (w¤(K); w¤¤(K)), we have
phh(c=¢p)¡ c > ½C(w;K)(¸=µ)K + w
which implies that (IRD) is not binding under D{mode, given ½C(w;K) and
w. Then, by using inequality (*) and the fact that w 2 [w(K); w(K)] implies
½^D(w;K) · ½C(w;K) and (IRD) is not binding for ½C(w;K), we obtain
¦D(wt; w; ½C(w;K)) = phh¼(w)¡ c¡ phh(c=¢p) + ½C(w;K)wt
= phh¼(w)¡ c¡ phh(c=¢p) + ½C(w;K)(¸=µ)K
· ½C(w;K)(¸=®(K))
= ¦C(w):
Hence each old principal optimally chooses C{mode, given w and ½ =
½C(w;K). Also, by de¯nition, all ½ = ½C(w;K), wt = (¸=µ)K and w =
wC(K) satisfy the credit market equilibrium and labor market equilibrium
conditions as well. Thus these constitute an equilibrium in period t+ 1.
Next we take the interest rate ½D ´ minf½^D(w;K); ~½D(w;K)g and the
market wage w = wD(K) such that w 2 (0; w(K)][ [w(K);1). Then, since
w 2 (0; w(K)] [ [w(K);1), w(K) > w¤(K) and w(K) < w¤¤(K), we have
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½D ´ minf½^D(w;K); ~½D(w;K)g ¸ ½C(w;K) for such w and K. Then, we
have
(¸=®(K))½D = ¦D(wt; w; ½D)
¸ (¸=®(K))½C(w;K)
= ¦C(w):
Hence all old principals will choose D{mode, given w and ½ = ½D ´ minf½^D(w;K); ~½D(w;K)g.
Finally suppose that w = w(K). Then we can take ½ = ½C(w(K);K) =
½^D(w(K);K) due to the de¯nition of w(K). Given these market prices, we
have
¦D(wt; w; ½) = (¸=®(K))½^D(w;K)
= (¸=®(K))½C(w;K)
= ¦C(w);
which shows that each old principal is indi®erent for choosing C{mdoe and
D{mode given such w and ½.
(ii) Necessity Part: Suppose that C{mode becomes an equilibrium in period
t + 1. Then w = wC(K) must hold (labor market equilibrium). Also w 2
[w(K); w(K)] must be satis¯ed. Suppose not. Then we have minf½^D(w;K); ~½D(w;K)g >
½C(w;K). Thus ½^D(w;K) > ½C(w;K) or ~½D(w;K) > ½C(w;K). Then,
½ = ½C(w;K) must hold for C{mode to be an equilibrium in period t + 1
((BEC{C): ®(K)¦C(w) = ¸½C(w;K)). First, when (IRD) is not binding
for ½ = ½C(w;K), by using inequality (*), we obtain
¦D(wt; w; ½C(w;K)) = phh¼(w)¡ c¡ phh(c=¢p) + ½C(w;K)(¸=µ)K
> (¸=®(K))½C(w;K)
= ¦C(w);
which shows that each old principal should choose D{mode, given w and
½ = ½C(w;K). This is a contradiction. Second, when (IRD) is binding for
½ = ½C(w;K), we have
¦D(wt; w; ½C(w;K)) = phh¼(w)¡ w ¡ 2c
= (¸=®(K))~½D(w;K)
> (¸=®(K))½C(w;K)
= ¦C(w)
which shows that each old principal should choose D{mode again. This is a
contradiction again.
Next suppose that D{mode becomes an equilibrium in period t+1. Then
w = wD(K) must hold (labor market equilibrium). Also w 2 (0; w(K)] [
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[w(K);1) must be satis¯ed. Suppose not. Then we have ½C(w;K) >
½^D(w;K) and (IRD) is not binding under D{mode (since w 2 (w¤(K); w¤¤(K))).
Thus ½ = ½^D(w;K) must hold in such D{mode equilibrium. However, then
since ½C(w;K) > ½^D(w;K), we obtain
¦C(w) = (¸=®(K))½C(w;K)
> (¸=®(K))½^D(w;K)
= phh¼(w)¡ c¡ phh(c=¢p) + ½^D(w;K)(¸=µ)K
= ¦D(wt; w; ½^D(w;K));
which shows that each old principal should choose C{mode, given ½ =
½^D(w;K) and w. This is a contradiction.
Finally suppose that there exists a mixed mode equilibrium with the
equilibrium prices w and ½. Then ½ = ½^D(w;K) = ½C(w;K) must be
satis¯ed because ¦D(wt; w; ½) = ¦C(w) = (¸=®(K))½ must hold in the
mixed mode equilibrium. Solving ½C(w;K) = ½^D(w;K) for w gives w 2
fw(K); w(K)g. Q.E.D.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
For su±ciently small ¸ > 0, we have µw¤(K) > ¸K for all K 2 (0;KD) be-
cause w¤(K) ¸ wC(K) > 0 for allK > 0. Then, sinceKt+1 = (µ=¸)w¤(Kt) >
Kt for all t ¸ 0 and for all Kt 2 (0;KD), when the initial condition is
given by K0 2 (0;KD) Kt increases over time at least until it reaches KD.
Also, when ¸ is small enough, KD becomes large enough and wD(KD) ap-
proaches to g¡1(¾=phh), where recall that ¾ ´ (2°)=°, because (LMC) and
limK!1m(K; µ) = °µ by our assumption. Thus when ¸ is su±ciently small,
we have KD !1 and wD(KD)! g¡1(¾=phh).
Note that, due to Proposition 1, the region in which C{mode becomes
a static equilibrium is given by QC ´ f(w;K) 2 <2+ j w(K) ¸ w ¸ w(K)g.
Note also that w is increasing and w is decreasing. Thus, if w( ~K) = w( ~K)
exists for some ¯nite ~K, we have (wD(KD);KD) =2 QC for small enough
¸. If limK!1w(K) = limK!1w(K) exists, we have (wD(KD);KD) =2 QC
again except for the knife{edge case that limK!1 w(K) = limK!1w(K) =
g¡1(¾=phh). Hence, generically the economy eventually converges to the
D{mode steady state KD in the long run when ¸ is su±ciently small.
When the initial condition K0 satis¯es K0 > KD, we have ¸Kt >
µwD(Kt) for all Kt > KD. Since (wD(KD);KD) =2 QC generically holds
when ¸ is small enough, we have (w(Kt);Kt) =2 QC for all Kt > KD as
well when ¸ is small enough. Thus Kt eventually converges to the D{mode
steady state KD in the long run. Q.E.D.
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7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Note ¯rst that ¸ a®ects only for determining the steady state values KD
and KC . Then we can take the values of ¸ > 0 such that K 00 < KC < K 0
and wD(KC) > w(KC) are satis¯ed. This is done by taking the values of
¸ to ensure that KC < K 0 but KC is close to K 0 (See Figure 4). Since all
the functions w, w and wi (i = D;C) are independent of ¸, we can actually
¯nd the range of such parameter values of ¸.
Then, given such ¸, if the economy starts from K0 2 (K 00;K 0), multiple
equilibrium paths arise where some of them converge to the D{mode steady
stateKD but others converge to the C{mode steady stateKC (See Figure 4).
To see this, note that wC(KC) 2 (w(KC); w(KC)) and wD(KC) > w(KC).
Also we have wC(K0) 2 (w(0); w(0)) for K0 2 (K 00;K 0). Thus C{mode
becomes an equilibrium at initial period (t = 0). Then, since wC(KC) 2
(w(KC); w(KC)), the economy can converge to the C{mode steady state
KC . On the other hand, since wD(KC) > w(KC), there exists some period,
say T ¸ 1, such that D{mode can be an equilibrium from period T onward
and the economy converges to the D{mode steady state KD as well.
However, if the economy starts at K0 ¸ K 0, then we have wC(Kt) >
w(Kt) for all t. Thus there are no equilibria which converge to the C{mode
steady state KC . Q.E.D.
8 Appendix B
In the main text we have made the following conditions:
² Assumption 2. ¼(g¡1(1=phh)) > maxf(g¡1(1=phh)+2c)=phh; c=¢p+
c=phhg.
² Assumption 4. (i) minw¸0 ¡(w;1) < 0, and (ii) g¡1(¾=phl) >
w(1).
² It is optimal for any old principal to implement high e®ort pair (a; em) =
(h; h) from any matched project under D{mode:
¦(wt; wt+1; ½t+1) ¸ ¦¤(wt+1) ´ maxfpll¼(wt+1)¡wt+1; phl¼(wt+1)¡wt+1¡cg:
² (ICPD) is satis¯ed at the optimal contract in Problem D.
² It is optimal for any old principal to implement e®ort pair (a; ep) =
(h; l) from any matched project under C{mode.
² (ICPC0) is satis¯ed at the optimal contract in Problem C.
In this Appendix we will give some parametric conditions for all these
restrictions to be satis¯ed simultaneously. To this end we will assume that
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the production function Y = F (L) takes the following form: Y = AL´ where
A > 0 and ´ 2 (0; 1).
Then we can show the following:
¼(g¡1(1=phh)) = (1¡ ´)Ap¡´hh ;
and
g¡1(1=phh) = ´Ap
1¡´
hh :
Thus we have
¼(g¡1(1=phh)) > g¡1(1=phh)=phl
as long as
(1¡ ´)=´ > phh=phl: (A1)
(i) Given (A1), Assumption 2 will be satis¯ed when c > 0 is small enough.
In what follows we will assume (A1). We also de¯ne the following function:
G(A) ´ ¼(g¡1(1=phh))¡ c=¢p
= (1¡ ´)Ap´hh ¡ c=¢p:
Next, letting ¡(w) ´ ¡(w;1), we can show that ¡(w) attains its mini-
mum at w = wmin where
wmin ´ ´A
µ
1
1¡ ¯ phh ¡ phl
¶1¡´
where ¯ ´ limK!1 ¯(K) < ° 2 (0; 1) by our assumption. Then we can
show that
min
w¸0
¡(w) = H(A) ´ 1 + ´
´
wmin + c
·
1¡ 1
1¡ ¯
µ
phh
¢p
+ 1
¶¸
:
Now, by taking small ¯ (so small °) and small ¢p (letting phl close to phh),
then we can verify thatH 0(A) > 0 takes a small value but G0(A) = (1¡´)p´hh
is not changed. Thus, in such case there exist some A and A such that for
all A 2 (A;A) we have G(A) > 0 > H(A) where H(A) = G(A) = 0. This
shows that when ¯ and ¢p are small we obtain
¼(g¡1(1=phh)) > c=¢p;
and
min
w¸0
¡(w) < 0:
Given such A 2 (A;A), we can ¯nd some small c > 0 such that Assumption
2 is satis¯ed.16 In what follows we will assume A 2 (A;A).
16In fact we can take small c=¢p by keeping ¢p small as well.
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(ii) Next we will verify Assumption 4(ii). Taking A close to A de¯ned above,
limK!1w(K) = limK!1w(K) = wmin because H(A) = minw ¡(w) = 0.
Recalling that wmin = ´A((1=(1 ¡ ¯))phh ¡ phl), when A ! A we have
Assumption 4(ii):
g¡1(¾=phl) > w(1) ' wmin
as long as
(¾=phl)1¡´ >
µ
1
1¡ ¯ phh ¡ phl
¶
(A3)
which we will assume.
(iii) Next we will show that it becomes optimal for any old principal to
implement high e®ort pair (a; em) = (h; h) from both tasks of any matched
project under D{mode. First note that, due to Assumption 2, we have
¦¤(wt+1) = phl¼(wt+1)¡ wt+1 ¡ c:
Thus it is su±cient to show that
phh¼(wt+1)¡c¡maxfphh(c=¢p)¡½t+1wt; wt+1+cg ¸ phl¼(wt+1)¡wt+1¡c;
which will be satis¯ed if
¼(wt+1) > phh(c=¢p2)
because ½t+1wt ¸ 0, wt+1 ¸ 0 and Assumption 2. However, since wt+1 ·
g¡1(1=phh) in any equilibrium, this inequality will be satis¯ed if
¼(g¡1(1=phh)) > phh(c=¢p2)
which can be written by
(1¡ ´)Ap¡´hh > (c=¢p2): (A4)
Now let k ´ c=¢p2 and keep k constant and small. Then, we can take
small ¢p and c=¢p while keeping k constant and small. Hence (A4) will be
satis¯ed for small k, given A 2 (A;A).
(iv) Next we will check that (ICPD) in Problem D will be satis¯ed at the
optimal D{mode contract without (ICPD). To see this, ¯rst consider the case
that (IRD) is binding at the optimal D{mode contract without (ICPD). In
particular let rDt+1 = 0 and R
D
t+1 = (wt+1 + c)=phh which satisfy (IRD) and
(LLD). Then (ICPD) can be written by
¼(wt+1) ¸ c=¢p+ (wt+1 + c)=phh;
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which will be satis¯ed if
¼(g¡1(1=phh)) > c=¢p+ (g¡1(1=phh) + c)=phh: (A6)
However, given (A1), when c=¢p and c are small, (A6) will hold as well.
Second, suppose that (IRD) is not binding at the optimal contract without
(ICPD). Then we have rDt+1 = ¡½t+1wt and RDt+1 = phh(c=¢p)¡ ½t+1wt by
Lemma 1. Then (ICPD) can be written by
¼(wt+1) ¸ c=¢p+ phh(c=¢p)
which will be satis¯ed if
¼(g¡1(1=phh)) > (1 + phh)(c=¢p): (A7)
However, when (c=¢p) is small, (A7) will hold as well.
(v) Next we will show that it is optimal for any old principal to implement
e®ort pair (a; ep) = (h; l) from any matched project under C{mode. As
we have seen, it is never optimal to implement high e®ort pair (a; ep) =
(h; h) due to Assumption 1. Thus the remaining case is that the principal
implements low e®ort pair (l; l): In that case the principal can obtain at
most pll¼(wt+1)¡wt+1. Thus it is not optimal to implement low e®ort pair
if ¢q¼(wt+1) ¸ c which will be satis¯ed by (A7) due to ¢q > ¢p.
(vi) Finally (ICPC0) will be satis¯ed when ¼(g¡1(1=phh)) > g¡1(1=phh)=phl+
c=¢q. This will hold when c > 0 is small, given (A1).
8.1 Appendix C
We will modify the basic model by introducing the possibility of default by
young principals in credit market and show that the parameter ¸ can be
interpreted as the measure of contracting costs in credit market.
Instead of assuming perfectly competitive credit market, we consider the
Bertrand competition among young principals who compete each other to
attract the fund for project ¯nancing by o®ering interest rates to creditors
(young agents). Suppose that each young principal may renege on making
repayment and be in default after she borrows from creditors. Suppose also
that each young agent (creditor) can access to the storage technology which
converts one unit good in the current period into " > 0 goods in the next
period. Thus, each young agent never lends to a young principal unless
she can commit herself not to go on default (otherwise the agent will use
the storage technology instead of lending to credit market). However, each
young principal can develop the veri¯cation technology by which she can
perfectly reveal the hard evidence about her repayment decision and per-
suade creditors not to be in default. To develop such veri¯cation technology,
each young principal needs to raise ¸ goods per project.
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Then we consider the following two{stage game in credit market in each
period (say period t): In the ¯rst stage young principals simultaneously o®er
the loan contracts which specify the interest rate to be paid to creditors in
period t + 1 and commitment to the development of the veri¯cation tech-
nologies. Let denote by ½it+1 the interest rate o®ered by young principal i in
period t (thus it will be paid in period t+1). In the second stage, given the
loan contracts o®ered by young principals, young agents (creditors) decide
to which young principals they should lend their wage income wt. Then
only the young principals who developed the veri¯cation technologies can
attract credit from young agents (because otherwise young agents can use
the storage technology to obtain " unit goods when they are old). Also, by
the Bertrand competition among young principals, they will bid up the in-
terest rates to make them break even. Thus they will o®er the same interest
rate ½t+1 ´ ½it+1 in equilibrium, and the equilibrium interest rate ½t+1 is
determined by the same break even conditions (BEC{C) and (BEC{D) as
we have already derived in the main text. Finally we assume that " is small
enough so that young agents never use the storage technology in equilibrium.
By modifying the model in the above way, we can interpret ¸ as the pa-
rameter value to measure how it is costly to detect default in credit market.
Put di®erently ¸ captures the contracting costs incurred by the principals
(borrowers) to commit themselves not to go on default in credit market.
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Figure 7: Multiple Mixed Equilibrium Paths
Km
44
